

# The Hijrah Communities and Religious Superficiality: Ideology and Religiosity of the Islamic Hijrah Communities on Social Media

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## Abstract

The *Hijrah* communities in Indonesia are a complex and paradoxical phenomenon. These communities can be identified by how its members express religious attitudes on social media, especially Facebook. This position on social media affects the members' religious and ideological merits in the Hijrah communities. This research applied a netnographic approach concerned with understanding how Hijrah community Facebook groups express their religiosity in texts, status, and images. The data sources were the members of Hijrah community Facebook groups in Indonesia. Through a qualitative approach with a netnographic design, this research succeeded in discovering a new hypothesis that 'Facebook is one of the authoritative sources as well as Instagram, Twitter, WhatsApp, and offline meetings in improving religious knowledge by the Hijrah communities.' This social media presence encouraged religious superficiality. In terms of ideology, the Hijrah communities showed ideological hybridity. In this case, exposed from various societies and streams received from populist Islamic scholarly authorities, religious attitudes virtually agreed upon by Hijrah communities were mixed.

## Keywords

Hybrid ideology; Muslim millennials; religiosity and Hijrah communities; religious superficiality; social media

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## Introduction

Over the past decade, Indonesia's political situation and social relations have experienced an abnormal change. This change is marked by the emergence of a fake hybrid Islamic identity. Still, Islamic identity is a product of social structure, politics, and cultural explosion or cultural shock. For example, the rise of the massive Islamic populism movement with politics as an object is the phenomenon of Hijrah among Muslim millennials. This occurrence can be traced from the rise of social media groups that campaign about the importance of Hijrah for the Muslim millennial generation. The movement begins with political support and even cultural appreciation from famous Nahdatul Ulama [traditionalist Sunni Islam movement] scholars from East Java, such as Ustadz Abdul Somad, Ustadz Adi Hidayat, and Ustadz Buya Yahya. As a result, various social media groups have sprung up to discuss issues related to *Hijrah*, a movement of religious transformation involving populist ways by exploiting religious symbols.

The phenomenon of Hijrah among Muslim millennials is inseparable from the strategy of the millennial generation in dealing with power relations in their daily lives (Sunesti et al., 2018). This belief reinforces the opinion that 'the phenomenon of Hijrah among Muslims millennials is not just a spiritual movement, but a product rooted in power relations of modern societies.' The phenomenon of Hijrah is identified as symbols inherent in *Salafi*-based Islamic movements and is considered the most intensely promoted ideology in the missionary endeavors or *da'wah* [religious broadcasting and its development in the community] (Sunesti et al., 2018). Hijrah among Muslim millennials is briefly marked by artificially compounded changes such as clothing changes from less Islamic to highly Islamic styles. Among female Muslims, this often involves transforming a new identity, such as wearing a *niqab* [veil]. Likewise, a new identity is characterized among male Muslims by not wearing pants that exceed below the *isbal* [ankles] (Nisa, 2018; Sunesti et al., 2018). Such artificial changes can be interpreted as an articulation of Hijrah undertaken by the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina to promote a better Islamic civilization. At this time, not as destructive as the actions of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who called for a move from Syria to Iraq and then joined the ISIS movement, this spirit is articulated in an expansive and creative space and expression (Sunesti et al., 2018). Recent theories assume that Hijrah, as an Islamic identity movement, is articulated in various faces and spaces, identified as the resultant of the populist *da'wah* movement carried out by celebrity Islamic preachers. In the end, social media is a sphere in which the Hijrah communities display all their identities.

The virtual space on social media allows these community members to interact discursively and express their understanding of religiosity through texts. Empirically, many scholars view the phenomenon of Hijrah as an articulation of identity per se (Rahman et al., 2018; Zulhazmi & Hastuti, 2018). At this time, the phenomenon of Hijrah among Muslim millennials, or Muslims in general, in Indonesia, is not just a matter of identity. It is a complex reality involving cultural and structural networks and has become an important issue to be studied. Therefore, the phenomenon of Hijrah can be interpreted as an expression of diversity with a broad dimension, including ideology, paradigm, and typical religiosity. Hence, in this context, this article focuses on understanding the ideology and religiosity of the Hijrah communities on Facebook.

## Literature Review

Since the present study is concerned with understanding the ideology and religiosity of Hijrah communities on Facebook, it is necessary to elaborate on two main concepts, namely: First, the relation of the concept of ideology to religiosity (Eagleton, 1994; Marimaa, 2011; Martin, 2014; Sharp, 2018; van Dijk, 1998), and how the preceding discourse addresses the concept of ideology and the essential role social media plays in shaping and spreading religious ideology; and second, social media and religiosity (Abdel-Fadil, 2017, 2018, 2019; Kgatle, 2018; Kietzmann et al., 2011; Mustafa et al., 2013; Nisa, 2018; Risdiana & Ramadhan, 2019; Wolf et al., 2018), and how the discourse, as mentioned earlier, elaborates on how social media becomes a space of reshaped religiosity.

### Ideology: Concept and its relation to social media

An ideology and texts are inseparable, for an ideology requires texts to represent ideas. Thus, to understand an ideology, texts are often used as consistently interpreted units of analysis. Benke and Wodak (2003) studied images and news in the globalized world by discussing images and icons. According to Benke and Wodak, ideology was represented as something that manifests and stands proudly before power. Ideology has also been hidden behind texts. Therefore, ideology and texts must be understood ideologically (Lassen et al., 2006). Texts have transformed functions, from message representations and communication markers to ideological representations and provocation tools (Benke & Wodak, 2003; Heer et al., 2003). In this context, Eagleton (1994) noted the ideology of some traditions. In classical traditions, ideology has been deeply interpreted. The post-structuralist althusserianism modified its meaning and continues in the modern tradition. The most popular and often heard sentence is 'as through the aperture of a camera, men and their nature are reflected in reverse.' This shows that reality is an inverted product on the retina stemming from a physical process that floats on the retina as an image (Eagleton, 1994; van Dijk, 1998). It means that ideology grows as a belief system and spreads among individuals, communities, and humans as shared ideas. As a result, the concept of texts and ideology can be summarized in as follows in Table 1.

**Table 1:** Concepts and definitions of ideology

Definitions	Sources
Manheim views ideology as a set of beliefs that are often inadequate for the development of historicity.	(Eagleton, 1994; Martin, 2015)
The traditional approach interprets ideology as a system of ideas. The classical approach identifies ideology as the following: (a) ideology is a false belief; (b) ideology of hiding social relations which is real and precise offers a deception to other social realities; and (c) ideology is a belief that is owned by someone else) ideology requires self-serving socially or politically.	(van Dijk, 1998)
Ideology is a type of human capital that can change when economic conditions also shift. In praxis, ideology also significantly affects the development of civilization at a specific time.	(North, 1981)


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Ideology as a social system contains beliefs about the world that include morality, the division of labor, the distribution of wealth, and the building of the social institution. (Barnett et al., 1993)

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These shared ideas are a product of ideology (van Dijk, 1998). The previous concepts and definitions are based on several assumptions; First, concepts are understood as the objects of ideology, such as representing the growth of the philosophical French enlightenment movement. Then, ideology is interpreted in a negative connotation, a domination system of the ruling class idea. As a result, ideology is defined as an erroneous idea towards the working class (van Dijk, 1998). To reveal the relationship between ideology and texts, ideology can be illustrated as in Figure 1.

**Figure 1:** Ideology as shared-ideas



*Note: Self-formulation from literature*

The above illustration reveals the notion that 'Ideology as shared ideas includes many dimensions. For example, an idea grows as a reason and a product of thought, resulting in two important categories, the knowledge, and the argumentation system.' In addition, ideology is also interpreted as daily ideas spread both personally and socially. Ideology also becomes part of knowledge and is used as a political belief. Subsequently, ideology also becomes part of critical thinking that seeks to dismantle and question various social realities. This notion initially suggests that ideology is expressed in multiple forms in everyday life. In short, ideology has a specific meaning for human life (van Dijk, 1998). Besides, understanding the meaning of ideology behind a text, as shown in Table 2, is vital in comprehending the text's concept in social science. Derrida (1994) and Barthes (1997), as mentioned by Wilson (2012), popularized the theory *il ny a pa de hors-texte* [nothing outside the text].

**Table 2:** General definitions in literature


Definitions	Literature
Initially, a text is only interpreted as something that comes to the surface and can be observed by the senses of the eye through reading	(Mitchell, 1987)
A text is more than just images or series of words; it is a photograph formed by emission; a channel of transmission of points; the meaning of human perception	(Barthes, 1977)

Thus, emissions gain space in a text and naturally reflect various (Gbadegesin & Onanuga, 2018) morals, values, and even ideology. Then, in this context, the relationship between a text and ideology must be understood. Ideology in political contestation is often spread in text and images.

Social media is an effective medium for spreading ideological values and voicing multiple ideological supports (Bruce, 2018). Social media, especially Facebook, makes texts significant in which ideology is conveyed to the public and users. As a theory, it can be elaborated especially in terms of the relationships among ideology, texts, and social media. The reason lies in the empirical-historical foundation. Social media currently takes up a significant space in any human life. It is an unseparated tool of human life. Therefore, social media could become a factory in which religious texts are mechanically produced.

According to Wolf et al. (2018), social media is defined in various meanings. As an example, social media is defined as 'a platform for creating profiles as well as making explicit and cross-cutting relationships' (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). In a more detailed editorial, Boyd and Ellison explained that social media allows users to create profiles and build visible and complex relationships among them (Kietzmann et al., 2011). Asur and Huberman (2010) defined social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn as offering pervasive networking for the community.

**Figure 2:** Building blocks of social media



*Note: Kietzmann et al. (2011)*

Social media, as Kietzmann et al. (2011) describe in Figure 2, is comprised of seven complex functions. Social media has (1) identity, as social media becomes a space for individuals to reveal themselves, including their identities; (2) relationship, as users 'use' social media as an instrument to connect with others; (3) reputation, as social media plays a role as an instrument to identify other people's social standing; (4) class, as users are encouraged to create a community; (5) conversation, as users of social media (e.g., Facebook) interact with one

another and carry out inter-text communication with others; (6) participating, as users will transfer, allocate, and acquire content; and (7) existence, as users understand the presence of other people or colleagues when they are available (Kietzmann et al., 2011).

Today, social media has a significant impact on the structure of humans' social behavior (Lillqvist et al., 2016). As a result, Facebook exists as more than just a tool or an instrument of communication. It has become an ideological tool through its ability to spread and share ideological opinions. Furthermore, Facebook psychologically influences its users. One possible theory is that social media emphasizes symbiotic interactions between industries and consumers through intimate and intense dialogues between the parties (Lillqvist et al., 2016). In addition, social media encourages the broad participation of virtual communities to produce opinions, sentiments, and even endorsements of various matters related to industrial products (Lillqvist et al., 2016), and other aspects of politics, culture, and even religion.

## Religion on social media: How is religion expressed in social media?

Indonesia's population is a pluralized and multicultural society in terms of religions, cultures, and ethnicities. There are at least six recognized religions in Indonesia (e.g., Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism). The adherents' numbers subsume 87.63% Islam, 7% Protestantism, 2.91% Catholicism, 1.69% Hinduism, 0.72% Buddhism, and 0.05% Confucianism (Markus, 2014). This diversity in religion shows that Indonesia is a pluralized country. Nevertheless, the relationships among religious communities in Indonesia are relatively dynamic. Horizontal conflicts based on religion have occurred in Indonesia, and such disputes must be understood contextually. Among those conflicts are the Poso Conflict (1998-2000), Ambon Conflict (1999), Tolikara Conflict (2015), Aceh Singkil Conflict (2015), and the Situbondo Conflict (1996). Even though Indonesia is a pluralized country, with a basic state philosophy of *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* [unity in diversity], the exclusive identity of Islam frequently dominates the public sphere (Nazmudin, 2018; Sularso, 2019). In this context, Islam is commonly articulated in the public sphere as the paradoxical identity.

In the post-reformation era, Islam in Indonesia emerged in heterogeneous images, where it appears not only as moderate but also in fundamental and radical ways (Sutopo, 2010). Fealy and White (2008) viewed that this change in the practice of Indonesian Islam has taken place since the 90s. Until today, Islam has been expressed in its radical face and sectarian. As a result, as seen on social media, the public sphere of Indonesian Islam becomes boisterous and creates internal tensions (Fealy & White, 2008). The simple explanation for this outcry is that social media is an instrument to spread interpretations of Islam, such as *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah* [groups that adhere to the *Quran* and imitate the behavior of the Prophet Muhammad] and *wahabism* [a religious reformation movement in Islam]. This spread of ideas is understandable because Indonesia currently has 175.2 million internet users (Haryanto, 2020). On a statistical note, internet users aged 16 to 64 years old access the internet through various types of devices, including mobile phones (96%), smartphones (94%), earlier-generation mobile phones (21%), laptop or desktop computers (66%), tablets (23%), game consoles (16%), and virtual reality devices (5.1%) (Franedya, 2019). Referring to the data submitted by CNBC Indonesia, Facebook users in Indonesia have reached 120 million (Franedya, 2019). This means that Facebook users in Indonesia are extensive in most levels of society. This fact considers various Islamic *mashabz* [school of thought regarding fiqh, or the human understanding and practices of the sharia, that Muslims follow in Indonesia], use social media, especially Facebook, to convey Islamic teachings and *da'wah*. For this reason, the Hijrah communities on

Facebook grow and develop (Bakhtin et al., 1982). As a consequence, religious understanding and teachings transform.

Törnberg and Törnberg (2016) identified how Islam is displayed on social media either by Muslims or among Islam's opponents or haters. In various forums, Islam is labeled by things associated with conflicts, violence, and extremism. The labels are produced subjectively and considered commonplace by multiple Islamic groups. In a section of their article, Törnberg and Törnberg explained how Islam is represented in the media. Many colors of Islam are systematically displayed by the media, from the peaceful face referring to *rahmatan lil 'alami* [grace to the universe], to the devious face, which indicates that Islam is associated with negative stereotypes such as terrorism and extremism (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016). Baker et al. (2013) conducted studies of Muslims and Islamic representations in the United Kingdom's media from 1998 to 2009. They found that Islam is displayed in an Islamophobic representation. The Islamic communities emerge and carry out counter-discourses regarding this negative viewpoint. The Hijrah communities with unique and differentiated platforms emerge, and they confront discourses that attack Islam. Törnberg and Törnberg (2016) interpreted the emergence of virtual Hijrah communities was to transform conventional media into citizen-based creators. Social media is not just an instrument for communication. Still, Muslim millennials, and the general modern society, influence each other in a sphere where cultural expressions, ideology, and religion are shed.

Castells (2009) interpretation serves as a framework for understanding how its followers currently express Islam by involving social media networks. Islam is not merely contested in terms of its meaning through debate, but with extraordinary speed, the meaning of Islam is imitated. For example, the Hijrah communities are not only in a social reality, but they also make social media a space where ideas are conveyed, and Islamic values are virtually taught. In this context, Castells (2009) introduced network society as a reality where technological advances provide the foundation of pervasive expansion of social networks for social organizations in every social structure, including religion (Habibi, 2011). Online social networking has pushed religion with individual and institutional challenges (Verschoor-Kirss, 2012). In general, information technology can improve religious rituals through growing religious communities on social media. Verschoor-Kirss identified how individual religious actions using social media, and being actively involved in the social education community, can have uncertain effects.

On the one hand, religious practices can be improved, but on the other hand, virtual coercive acts can impose religious shallowness (Verschoor-Kirss, 2012). Current theories explain that social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram determine and even shape understanding and religious behavior in modern society (Abdel-Fadil, 2019; Chitwood, 2019; Nisa, 2018). In a different issue, Chitwood (2019) identified that religious communities on social media frequently discuss food, family, and cultural negotiations designated as 'everyday piety.' As a result, the posts shared by the Muslim communities on Facebook are motivated by being pious individuals (Chitwood, 2019).

Abdel-Fadil (2019) hypothesized that Facebook groups promote the public visibility of religions, including Christianity, effectively building emotions, and encouraging identity, world views, and contestation. This notion means that the religious communities on Facebook do not only have a space where virtual interactions are built, but they also have space where ideology or religious worldviews are reshaped by exchanging ideas, information, and religious interpretations (Abdel-Fadil, 2019; Chitwood, 2019). For example, Facebook is believed to be a medium where information on religions is disseminated quickly and on a

broad scale, making Facebook a source of religious understanding. It is not surprising that in various countries, e.g., Malaysia and Indonesia, Facebook can instantly increase young people's religious knowledge (Mustafa et al., 2013).

Instantaneous religious traditions such as the phenomena of *copy-paste* and *share* increase and lead to disturbing behavior. All instantaneous religious traditions reflect shallow religious intellectuality and religious laziness, and shape the banality of people's religious behavior (Risidiana & Ramadhan, 2019). Nisa (2018) understood that social media is a space where Islamic social movements grow and become an essential instrument in encouraging various Islamic movements. A religious movement, such as the *One Day One Juz* (ODOJ) movement, is a portrait of how a migration movement like this uses social media effectively and can influence and shape religious sentiment semi-virtual Qur'anic movement (Nisa, 2018). The emergence of virtual Islamic movements such as the Hijrah communities on Facebook seems worth interpreting as an attempt by the middle class in Indonesia, especially youth, to innovate in influencing the Islamic public through the intensive use of information technology, especially social media. Unfortunately, the acceleration of religious communities on social media shows religious superficiality.

Referring to the previously mentioned theories, various indicators can be formulated to identify the Hijrah communities' religious superficiality on social media, namely the existence of status and opinion texts, which shows absolutism or feeling right and tends to negate different views. Likewise, there is an expression of religious fanaticism through defending uncritically or showing uncritical enthusiasm for religious interpretation that is spread virtually and originates from the popular Islamic preachers (Marimaa, 2011). The superficiality of religion can also be understood from the attitude that is easily trapped in verbal conflicts when opinions, status, and information are different from the religious communities' internal collective understanding on social media (Khosyatillah, 2018). This indicator is a marker of Hijrah communities' religious superficiality on Facebook.

## Methodology

### Method and its design

Social media and texts studies use critical discourse analyses to explore (Lillqvist et al., 2016; Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016). This research applied a qualitative approach (Skågeby, 2011) with online ethnographic or 'netnographic' design. Netnography was chosen as the research design because of its possibility of applying a naturalistic paradigm unobtrusive to information openly spread and available on online forums (Kozinets, 2010). This design helps to describe the contours and classifications of culture, and even ideologies expressed through texts on online forums, e.g., Facebook (Carter, 2015; Kozinets, 2010). The research data utilized were online data. This form of data collection does not require direct interaction (Kozinets, 2010). Therefore, data collection in this research is entirely online cultural interaction (Carter, 2015; Kozinets, 2010). The data in this research were texts in the form of status, opinions, and images. For data presentation, the approach deployed was 'archiving,' such as rewriting, screenshots, and re-copying (Kozinets, 2010).



## Data source and its analysis

An ethnographic interpretation was applied to understand data intensely observed in several groups of Hijrah communities in practice. There were several data source criteria. First, the Hijrah community groups that accepted researchers as part of the virtual communities, and second, the Hijrah community Facebook groups had a large number of active members. Based on these two criteria, the Hijrah community groups on Facebook were selected as the unit of analysis as follows:

**Table 3:** Hijrah community Facebook groups

No.	Name of Group	Total Members
1.	Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia	2,157,928
2.	Sahabat Hijrah Indonesia	59,877
3.	Motivasi Hijrah Cinta	1,148,288
4.	Pemuda Hijrah	11,463
5.	Motivasi Hijrah Ikhwan dan Akhwat	7,160
6.	Motivasi Hijrah Bersama	10,540

Several arguments, as displayed in Table 3, were fundamental in the selection of the data field. First, the six Hijrah Facebook groups had many members. Second, after being observed and monitored consistently, members of the six Facebook groups were considered active users in sharing status and opinions and holding discussions. The two reasons mentioned above became important because this study intensively tried to understand the Hijrah communities' texts on Facebook (Skågeby, 2011). As for the data analysis, the netnography adopted at least six steps commonly applied to ethnography, namely, research planning, entree, data collection, interpretation, ensuring ethical standards, and research representation. These processes could then be summarized into five stages. First, defining the research question, social site, or the topic to be studied; second, selection and identification of the communities; third, community participant observation (e.g., engagement and immersion) and data collection; fourth, data analysis and iterative interpretation of findings; and fifth, writing, presenting and reporting research findings that are theoretical and have policy implications (Kozinets, 2010).

The netnographic procedure is in accordance with Carter's (2015) definition of virtual ethnography or, in another term, netnography. Carter viewed that virtual ethnography is not only virtual in the sense of being disembodied, but virtuality also connotes being inadequate for practical purposes, even if not strictly the real thing (although this definition of virtuality is often suppressed in favor of its trendier alternative). Virtual ethnography is adequate for the practical purpose of exploring the relations of mediated interactions. Even if it is inadequate for the real article in methodologically purist terms, it is an adaptive ethnography that sets out to suit itself to the conditions it finds itself (Carter, 2015, p. 65). In this context, the data analysis or interpretation approach referred entirely to Skågeby's (2011) model. Skågeby offered four stages of text analysis from virtual communities: first, elicitation, which relates to the data collection in the form of internet users' comments after previously formulating theoretical code categories; second, reduction processes such as the selection of initial categories and a specific list of words, along with coding, which is to build code from the theory and list of words that appear; third, clustering by placing the code in the appeared-

users' comments; and fourth, generating or producing a proposal through the use of qualitative analysis and interpretative design patterns that are creative and critical.

## Ethics

Ethics approval was granted by the Research Institution and Community Service (LPPM) at State Islamic Institute of Curup (IAIN Curup), Indonesia. The protocol was mentioned in the letter of statement Number: 070/In.34/LPPM/PP.00.9/5/2020. This letter informed the participants that this research applied to volunteer observation. It means the researchers became the users after requesting and getting permission from the administrators of the Hijrah community groups. In reporting, the researchers did not include participants' identifying information, and thus the participants were anonymous.

## Results and Discussion

### Religious superficiality and its evidence

Online observation of the six Hijrah community Facebook groups was conducted from September to November 2019. This period was intended to identify discourses and texts which were often shared in each of the Hijrah community groups. For example, Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia (MHI) group consisted of over 2 million members. On 29 November 2019, a member of the MHI group posted a video entitled 'Repent me.' This video, a recitation made by Ustadz Berri El-Mekky (a famous Islamic preacher and founder of Youth Innovators), contained the following message:

*"Asking forgiveness for everything we do. After that, ask God not to give us back our sinful self. Don't ask for our return. Who likes to lie; who likes to have negative thinking; who likes to slander people; who likes to find out someone's fault; who likes to laugh at people; who likes to make fun of people; their eyes like to see things that are not true, like watching porn; their ears like to hear things that are not true; who likes to bully; and who talks rude, ask for forgiveness with our sinful selves. After that, rabbana la tuziqulubaba ba'ad ishadaytana [O our Lord, don't you lead our hearts astray after You have instructed]."*

The video was liked by 554 people, shared more than 335 times, and commented on by seven members. One of the more interesting of the seven comments, "don't debate the video or question it, but ask for permission to re-share it," meaning that the members who interacted with this video agreed with Ustadz Berri El-Mekky. These attitudes and responses could be understood when the members were confronted with the material and content sourced from the populist preacher, who commonly becomes a role model for the members of Facebook's Hijrah communities. These attitudes and responses could be related to the fact that a member of the Sahabat Hijrah Indonesia group also shared a video from Ustadz Hanan Attaki (the founder of the Youth Hijrah movement who is actively preaching in the youth community such as punk kids, motorcycle gangs, skateboards, BMX bikes, parkour) on 29 November 2019, which contained an invitation to be strict. "Because God will accompany you; Who are we? Allah and the angels will plant the righteous people in the world and the hereafter." This

video was distributed for only 3 hours and received 82 likes, shared 33 times, and commented on by two members who asked permission to share it, and also tagged their friends.

In the Motivasi Hijrah Cinta group, on 26 November 2019, a member shared one of Ustadz Adi Hidayat's videos, who prayed for Muslims to have strength and victory in conflict-laden countries such as Palestine, Rohingya, Syria, and Afghanistan. No less than 745 people liked the video. It was distributed 133 times and commented on by 17 users. These comments asked permission to share the video. The video was also followed by hashtags such as #savepalestina. The members also posted *amen* at the end of Ustadz Adi Hidayat's prayers. Meanwhile, on 29 November 2019, in the Pemuda Hijrah group, a male user shared a video of a veiled woman that conveyed the meaning of Hijrah. According to the veiled woman in the video:

*"Hijrah is not difficult. It's hard only in our minds. What is Hijrah? Hijrah is the process of a servant for the better. Hijrah is not just an intention but proven by obedience. Hijrah is a beautiful but winding journey. The road is hard, but there is a sense of pleasure inside. That Hijrah is, by Allah; from Allah; to Allah. Hijrah is hard, but we will get used to it. Never listen to other people's scorn. Just hear the call of Allah the Almighty. The migration moved, moved on. Where to move? Move to better. Abandon immorality, renown. Improve heart. The real Hijrah is when prayer can change our lives. Stop telling lies. When the eyes no longer see danger, and the heart is awake from immorality."*

A similar pattern was found in other Hijrah community groups, where a member shared videos, texts, and images sourced from the famous preacher. Then, the Hijrah community group members shared and guaranteed the video content uncritically. There were several meanings formulated from this occurrence. First, group members' religiosity was determined through the sacralization of *ulama* [cleric] agreed upon by the Hijrah communities. The attitudes of condoning and not being critical of the delivered propaganda content were an indicator of this proposed hypothesis as religious superficiality (Nisa, 2018), where trust in the messages of popular preachers such as Ustadz Abdul Somad, Ustadz Adi Hidayat, and Ustadz Khalid Basalamah were the products of digital authority, a religious authority that contains trust therein. The power of social media drove capabilities. Social media has succeeded in being a channel to strengthen popular authority (Misbah, 2019).

It is undeniable that internet users' attitudes, either social media users or those who only use the internet for browsing, are formed through daily exposure to internet content. Implications for the behavior such as adultery, gangsterism, drugs, gambling, vandalism, suicide, and even radicalism are formed (Alao et al., 2006; Bedu et al., 2008; Liao et al., 2008; Misbah, 2019; Yahaya & Buang, 2010). In this context, the belief in popular preachers deserves meanings. In addition to the preachers' analytical capabilities, social media's role in shaping public trust is also worthy of being considered an independent force in strengthening the preachers' authority in Hijrah communities on Facebook. This encourages a hypothesis that 'the religiosity of members of the Hijrah community groups is superficial.' Religious shallowness can be identified through the exclusivity of religious understanding, the unproductive debate in religion, fatalism in religion, and by not involving a critical mind about religion.

Risdiana and Ramadhan (2019) emphasized that the most dominant indicator of superficiality in religion is the growth of the copy-paste, instant share, and accepting understanding of culture. Such an indicator was found in Hijrah communities on Facebook. An intense observation of Hijrah communities on Facebook empirically showed consistent evidence. For

example, in the Sahabat Hijrah Indonesia group, the dominant activity found amid the members was only to give out, re-share, and like. This was also found in the Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia group. A copy-paste culture, sharing, and giving likes for the status posted by this group members could be identified from both groups. Statistically, the copy-paste culture and share in the six Hijrah communities on Facebook are presented in Table 4.

**Table 4:** Frequency of copy-paste and share activities on Facebook

No.	Communities	Activities	Frequency
1.	Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia	<i>First Person Shared</i>	120-150
		<i>Asked to Share and Copy-Paste</i>	80-90%
		<i>Liked</i>	1,000-5,000
2.	Sahabat Hijrah Indonesia	<i>Supported the Content</i>	90-95%
		<i>First Person Shared</i>	110-130
		<i>Asked to Share and Copy-Paste</i>	85-92%
3.	Motivasi Hijrah Bersama	<i>Liked</i>	900-1,500
		<i>Supported the Content</i>	90-96%
		<i>First Person Shared</i>	120-149
4.	Pemuda Hijrah	<i>Asked to Share and Copy-Paste</i>	100-120
		<i>Liked</i>	1,100-1,500
		<i>Supported the Content</i>	95-97%
5.	Motivasi Hijrah Ikhwan dan Akhwat	<i>First Person Shared</i>	100-120
		<i>Asked to Share and Copy-Paste</i>	90-95%
		<i>Liked</i>	1,000-1,200
6.	Motivasi Hijrah Cinta	<i>Supported the Content</i>	95%
		<i>First Person Shared</i>	130-140
		<i>Asked to Share and Copy-Paste</i>	91-93%
		<i>Liked</i>	1,300-1,400
		<i>Supported the Content</i>	96%
		<i>First Person Shared</i>	130-135
		<i>Asked to Share and Copy-Paste</i>	96%
		<i>Liked</i>	1,300-1,400
		<i>Supported the Content</i>	97%

*Note: Data gathered December 2019, data automatically changed daily*

The data demonstrate various meanings: First, the frequency of sharing from the first person seemed linear with the number of members of Hijrah community groups on Facebook. 'the more members, the higher frequency of status production.' This was supported by the fact that during December 2019, the Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia group showed status updates related to Islam and motivation as many as 120-150 occurrences. It could be highlighted that the gap between the groups of Hijrah did not deviate much. This was caused by the existence of relationships between the Hijrah communities. There were a few members in one Hijrah community that also became members of another Hijrah group. This membership exchange was caused by the gap between the frequencies of noticeable status updates. Second, the cultural homogeneity in responding to information disseminated in the group. Homogeneity could be seen from the reaction by status sharing related to Islamic insights and giving likes. Third, the high support level for shared content could also be considered homogeneous. To understand this issue, it is essential to refer to the meaning and concept of religiosity. Religiosity refers to psychological feelings where humans believe in a deity, and this belief is formed through religious piety and religious zeal (Salleh, 2012). In this context, Hijrah community members' religiosity is also driven by two reasons, 'trying to be pious' and 'trying to understand the discipline of religion.' Unfortunately, the logical source used is only virtual

with instant information that is easily accessed without filtering. This can be detailed in Table 5.

**Table 5:** Characteristics of Hijrah community Facebook groups

Group Name	Issues Characters
Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia	Posts more on introduction to basic Islamic teachings, based on Sunnah and Quran.
Sahabat Hijrah Indonesia	Posts dominated by Hijrah motivation
Motivasi Hijrah Cinta	Posts and introduction to Islamic households.
Pemuda Hijrah	Posts on motivation, politics, and Fiqh.
Pemuda Hijrah	Posts of the motivation for Hijrah are more <i>salafi-da'wah</i> in style.
Motivasi Hijrah Ikhwan dan Akhwat	Posts of the motivation for Hijrah are more oriented towards <i>salafi-da'wah</i> style.
Motivasi Hijrah Bersama	More motivational posts and popular information about Islam

The data in Table 5 seems to confirm a theory that Facebook groups for the Hijrah communities function as the sources of Islamic knowledge accessed instantly and spread quickly (Mustafa et al., 2013; Risdiana & Ramadhan, 2019). However, the consistency of materials disseminated in Hijrah communities indicated a kind of ideological relation in the materials and issues shared. These issues consistently motivated how to do Hijrah and practice Islam purely in accordance with the Sunnah (words, deeds, and *taqir* [determination of Rasulullah SAW]) and Quran (the holy book of Islam). It is a precondition for strengthening and catalyzing Islam's ideology and worldviews correlated with the ideology of *salafi-wahabism* [a religious reformation movement in Islam]. This sect developed from the preaching of an 18th-century Muslim theologian named Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab who came from Najd, Saudi Arabia. This was marked by disseminating contents from *salafi* preachers such as Ustadz Khalid Basalamah and Ustadz Firanda Andirja. The contents of *ahlussunah wal jamaah* preachers [the followers of beliefs shared by the Prophet Muhammad, and his companions] such as Ustadz Adi Hidayat and Ustadz Abdul Somad, were also frequently disseminated such rhetoric. A trend was found in which Hijrah members instantly and mechanically chose popular Islamic preachers. It was considered mechanical because sharing a status in a group stimulated other members to return widely and re-share the status. Indeed, this sharing was motivated by the desire to share knowledge and increase religious understanding. As a result, apprehending Islam instantly by only relying on materials sourced from eligible social media affects the shallowness of religiosity (Nisa et al., 2018). Nevertheless, religious shallowness is more dominant through the presence of a person's social presence correlated with religion, for example, intolerance and radicalism.

Theoretically, intolerance, radicalism, and religious fanaticism are the products of religious superficiality. These behaviors stem from selfishness in religion, identifying a religion to be the truest, and having a perceived deep understanding of religion (Nopriyansa, 2019). Religious shallowness can be defined as an attitude that discriminates against others' existence and makes judgments based solely on symbolic matters of religion and religious behavior. It is an exclusive attitude that makes it difficult to understand and accept differences in other religious expressions (Nopriyansa, 2019; Rink & Sharma, 2018). In this context, intolerant behavior, radicalism, and religious fanaticism are considered as the products of religious shallowness. Although other scholars assess intolerance, fanaticism represents

fundamentalism, where religion tends to be used to dominate other existences (Rink & Sharma, 2018). However, broader than that, religious superficiality arises from an artificial nature in understanding Islam. Artificial in this regard means having a skewed understanding of Islam (Rink & Sharma, 2018).

This understanding is considered artificial because religious superficiality is caused by studying Islam from non-authoritative traditions, such as relying on Google, YouTube, or Facebook groups. Of course, this tradition is inadequate in understanding the complexities of Islam, predominantly Islamic *meta-framework* such as the Quran, Hadith, and other Islamic practices. A deep and accurate understanding of Islam, can only be obtained from the mouths of scholars and formal education, such as Islamic boarding schools and universities (Rumadi, 2012). The superficiality of religion certainly has an impact on the religious followers' behavior and attitudes. In the context of Hijrah communities on Facebook, religious shallowness encourages fanaticism and intolerance to religious expressions other than *manhaj* [religious teachings] they learn (Rohmatika & Hakiki, 2018). Several verbal attitudes indicate religious fanaticism and intolerance in Hijrah communities on Facebook, such as reactions when other members have different opinions with their idol ustadz or verbally abusing (e.g., verbally bullying) members for their understanding of Islamic traditions. The following excerpts are sample texts:

*"The cult of tombs that are considered sacred such as those of saints, has become epidemic among the people. It is often heard that a group of people make pilgrimages to a certain grave as if doing a pilgrimage. Their love to such a tomb is so great. They are willing to defend it even though they have to shed blood."*

(FHP, a group member of the Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia)

*"In my opinion, who posted this was an Ahmadiyah follower. Maybe he doesn't have any friends out there. So he makes a big noise here."*

(NR, a group member of the Sahabat Hijrah Indonesia)

The narrated texts inform that exclusive behavior, fanaticism, and intolerance towards differences in religious understanding can be traced from Hijrah community Facebook groups in Indonesia. Presumably, this implies that uniform tradition and filtering of religious ideas do not fit the pattern, understanding, and homogeneous practice among the Hijrah communities on social media (Colas & Jacobs, 1997; Nisa, 2018; Risdiana & Ramadhan, 2019). Not surprisingly, the resistance will be shown in different posts and unwanted share in the Hijrah communities. This behavior indicates religious fanaticism that refuses to accept differences (Colas & Jacobs, 1997; Mustafa et al., 2013). Departing from the existing theoretical and empirical frameworks, superficiality or shallowness of religion can be defined as religious attitudes that grow from a weak understanding of Islamic teachings gained instantly on social media and non-authoritative sources. In addition, the phenomenon of Hijrah communities on social media, especially Facebook, needs to be understood. The existing indicators of religious superficiality are the presence of text that indicates an attitude of absolutism or feeling right and negating different views, and an expression of religious fanaticism through defending uncritically or showing uncritical enthusiasm for religious interpretation (Marimaa, 2011). Several examples of text and screenshots can be submitted in an effort to verify this hypothesis. The illustrations are markers of expressions that arise from religious shallowness.


Receiving information from inadequate and even non-authoritative sources is the main reason for such religious shallowness.

**Figure 3:** Expression of enthusiasm



*Note: Reproduced from the Facebook group of Pemuda Hijrah*

**Figure 4:** Uncritical attitude of fanaticism



*Note: Reproduced from the Facebook group of Sahabat Hijrah Indonesia*

The understood meanings from Figure 3 and Figure 4 emphasize an attitude of uncritical fanaticism, where the cult of Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Hussein Shihab (an Indonesian Islamic figure who is known as the leader and founder of Front Pembela Islam) was as a charismatic Islamic leader similar to Islamic saints. Meanwhile, the image emphasizes an exclusive perspective in which the Salafi schools' version (Muslims who advocate a binary and literal interpretation of Islamic teachings) of Hijrah communities is the most correct. This expression is a signifier of the psychological reality where members of the group experience uncritical enthusiasm (Marimaa, 2011). In addition, the religious shallowness appears on social media in a fanatical attitude displayed by uncritical reasoning in Islamic content like status, video, and status related to Islam. In this context, the fanaticism played on the idolization of figures and populist scholars such as Ustadz Adi Hidayat, Ustadz Abdul Somad, and *salafism* preachers [adherents and followers of Salafi schools] as Ustadz Khalid Basalamah and others.

On the one hand, each reaction of fanaticism is a negative influence, but on the other hand, it also has neutral implications and even has a positive impact (Marimaa, 2011). The word fanaticism itself comes from the Latin *fānaāticē* with the adjective *fānaāticus*. The adjective is built from the noun *fānum*, which means a place of worship, shrines, monasteries, or temples. The other term that is also often found is *fano*, which refers to important offerings (Kleis et al., 1986). Colas and Jacobs (1997) developed the definition of 'fanatical' as supporting profane actions, destroying other religions, destroying cultural heritage, discuss taboo, and mock the God of other religions.

Although 'fanatical' has many meanings, fanaticism is often associated with negative shallowness of religion, intolerance, and even extremism. However, Talletyre (1919, as cited in Kinne, 1943, p. 534) succeeded in introducing, verbatim, Voltaire's voice in a useful manner for humans as "I wholly disapprove of what you say-and will defend to the death your right to say it." Another positive form of fanaticism, namely enthusiasm or desire to learn religion, can also be referred to as an act of fanaticism, but fanatics are positive (Harmon, 2005). This definition indicates that Hijrah communities' religious enthusiasm is not merely associated with negative fanaticism interpreted as intolerance. The conclusion is based on several realities. First, the shared content discussed in the Facebook Hijrah groups was discussed at *tahzib al-akhlaqi* [a moral guide looking for religion and becoming a better person]. Second, no bullying was found, such as with hate speeches of the Hijrah communities' fellow Facebook members. From these data, the fanaticism theory of the members of Hijrah communities was expressed in religious asceticism. Indeed, this presupposed a dominant ideological religiosity that was unconscious and well-institutionalized in this community.

## Hybrid ideologies and its expression

An ideology is something that refers to the patrimony of the idols (Derrida, 1994). As Derrida discussed, Karl Marx further identified religion as an ideology and mysticism and theology. The ideology itself refers to more abstract things such as fantasmagorical, hallucinatory, fantastic, and imaginary. Sirait (2016) proposed the meaning of Islamic ideology by associating it with broader variables as religious attitudes such as radical, liberal, and moderate. In addition to the associative meaning, empirically and often expressed by the public, Islamic ideology has relations with religious societies such as Wahhabism, Sunni, and Shia. In this context, religious attitudes are constructed by Sirait (2016) as a framework for mapping Islamic ideologies. In relation to religious practices, ideology must also be understood from the anthropological perspective: the relationship between religion and culture (Barker, 2002). Ideology can be empirically identified, and that relationship grows in a religious community.

Likewise, the religious and cultural community has the same worldviews in understanding the daily world experiences (Hall, 1997; Sirait, 2016). Every human has a way of interpreting the world in which they live based on their institutionalized religion and culture (Hall, 1997). In this context, ideology is something that is embodied in religion. Referring to the concept of Barker (2002), Hall (1997), and Sirait (2016), as outlined above, the Islamic ideology expressed as a religious attitude by the members of Hijrah communities on Facebook is an ideology that is thoroughly hybridized. In an empirical element, the members of the Hijrah communities practiced Islam based on idolatry or being a patron of the authority of popular sources that they could instantly follow, and they tended to be a virtual union. An account on the Facebook Hijrah communities expressed a defense for Ustadz Abdul Somad when a video regarding the prohibition of saying Merry Christmas was debated in the Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia



community group. MTW, a member of the Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia Facebook group, quickly distributed the religious verdicts regarding the law about wishing a Merry Christmas. Unlike the previous account, an anonymous account holder shared a quote and image that was confirmed as follows:

*"Asy-Shaykh Al-Allamah Muhammad bin Salih Al-Utsaimin rahimahullah said, congratulating the disbelievers in the Christmas celebration or their other religious celebrations is haram according to the scholars' agreement [Al-Fatawa, 3/45]."*

The mentioned quote is to defend Ustadz Abdul Somad's statement emphasizing the prohibition of saying Merry Christmas to Christians. In a linear effort, another account holder quoted the Quran (Chapter 3, Verse 85), which states that 'people who have a religion other than Islam will be the losers in the world and the hereafter.' An account holder mentioned, 'why are Muslims forbidden to say Merry Christmas?' When Muslims say the phrase Merry Christmas, there are the word congratulations, as in merry, within the statement. When understanding the meaning of the word congratulations [Arabic السلام meaning salvation]. This is the true nature behind the greetings of Merry Christmas, which are (1) congratulations to you for the birth of your God; (2) congratulations to you for worshiping the cross; (3) congratulations to you for your belief that God has children; (4) congratulations to your identity; or (5) congratulations to you as you are happy with the rise of the crusaders who always hope the destruction of Islam. As a comment from a member of the Motivasi Hijrah Indonesia community in the Facebook group, these points could be understood that the purposes of the account holder in defense of Ustadz Abdul Somad extended to maintaining the dignity of the ustadz and strengthening the suggestions delivered by him. These data form the foundation of the hypotheses presented in this paper; namely, the Islamic ideology of the Hijrah communities' members on Facebook was more visible and indicated a hybrid ideology formed from the admirers of famous figures and the desire to search for instant religious understanding.

## Conclusion

Of the several issues, this research identified the same findings as revealed by Mustafa et al. (2013), where Facebook is a source of religious understanding for the members of Hijrah communities, in this sense, Islam. Facebook can increase the knowledge of religion. There is a significant difference that lies in the quality of understanding. This study found that the Hijrah communities' religiosity on Facebook have become superficial because the religious sources are not authoritative. This lack of authority is termed religious-superficiality, i.e., a condition where religion superficially relies on non-authoritative sources. In addition, this study proposed the hybrid-ideology term, which could be identified from religious attitudes showing the uncritical idolization of populist ustadz. The hybrid-ideology refers to a mixture of understanding of Islam from various existing schools of thought on social media, the internet, and YouTube. This mixture consists of understandings associated with schools, i.e., *ahlusunnah*, *wahhabism*, and *shi'i* [the varied traditions in interpreting Islam and the resulting sets of theological doctrine]. This happens because the Hijrah communities on Facebook only rely on teaching sources from the internet, but the sources are not authoritative. At this later stage, hybrid-ideologies are formed within the members of the Hijrah community. This implies the formation of shallow religious attitudes, fanaticism, and even intolerance in seeing differences in religious expressions. The Hijrah communities' members also show fanatical

attitudes toward the populist preachers who spearhead the Hijrah movement. The findings of this research are relatively different from the conclusions proposed by Sunesti et al. (2018), stating that the phenomenon of Hijrah and its complexity is an attempt to negotiate an identity that contains a specific ideology.

## Limitations

As research, this study has succeeded in informing and understanding the Hijrah communities' ideological features on Facebook. In practice, this study has weaknesses, especially in the empirical confirmation of the Hijrah communities' religious behavior and how the hybrid-ideology that grows among the Facebook Hijrah communities is expressed in daily religious behavior. Therefore, for further studies, it is possible to study and understand the Hijrah communities' religious behavior in their daily lives by identifying the linearity between ideology and religious behavior expressed in their daily lives.

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