

Artikel 001

by Artikel 001 Artikel 001

Submission date: 07-Jul-2022 02:37AM (UTC+0700)

Submission ID: 1867411351

File name: Islamic_Dynamics_in_Indonesia.pdf (208.86K)

Word count: 8285

Character count: 43870

Islamic Dynamics in Indonesia

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Abstract: *In contrast to countries in Southeast Asia such as Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and even Thailand, Islam in Indonesia has special characteristics. If these countries have a homogeneous tendency, on the other hand Indonesia is very heterogeneous. The strong hegemony of the authority of the religious life, tend to become a reason for the emergence of a monolithic color in religious life. Otherwise, in Indonesia, the strong pull of the relationship between Islam and the country it self, led to religious practice that necessitates the diversity, the denial of the diversity. The following article examines the religious diversity which apparent since Indonesia emerged as a country.*

Keywords: dynamics, Islam, Indonesia

Introduction

Although Islam is as the majority which is embraced by many of Indonesian, the understanding of Muslims toward the teachings of Islam itself is not homogenous. The differences in social, economic, and politic background has a large contribution on the emergence to the heterogeneity. In social context, Clifford Geertz for example, has differentiated Islam in Indonesia (Java precisely) to three categories; students, *abangan*, and *priyayi*.¹

The concept of Clifford Geertz recently received criticism from various circles. Azyumardi Azra, for example, call Geertz had a profound reluctance to acknowledge the influence of Islam in Java in particular. Geertz called it the Java Religion, rather than calling it Islam in Java.

Geertz implies that the majority of Javaness or Indonesian are not real Muslims, Islam is obeyed by only a small group of people.²

In addition, an anthropologist from California, United States of America was also inconsistent in setting the students, *abangan*, and *priyayi* as the variables. How do someone's religiousity behavior (represented by students and *abangan*) juxtaposed with social class (in this case is *priyayi*). In reality, there are religious *priyayi* (students) as well as *priyayi* who ignore the religion (*abangan*). In fact, it must be recognized that religious behavior or vice versa (whatever the religion is), it customarily occur and will remain forever.³

On one side, the significant arise of the religious diversity shows the high appreciation of Indonesian Muslims toward the different understanding and practice patterns. On the other side of this diversity is actually very prone to conflict. During the governance of the New Order Era, tri harmony was made to avoid the potential of conflict to spread to mislead to the national disintegration; inter-religious harmony (to whomever with different religions), intra-religious harmony (to whomever with the same religion), and the religious harmony with the government.

The existence of this rule shows that the diversity has big potential to create conflicts which is complicated to deal with. Moreover, not only among religions, but also between two different religions or with the government. We witnessed the end of the power of New Order Era and in the beginning of the reformation Era which emerged the conflict and took thousands of lives. As well as the cases in Pekalongan (1995), Tasikmalaya (1996), Rengasdengklok (1997), Sanggau Ledo, West Kalimantan (1996 and 1997), Ambon and Maluku since 1999, Ternate (1999 and 2000) to Sampit East Kalimantan (2000).

Relationship between Islam and Politics

One of Indonesian local wisdom says: *sekali air besar, sekali tepian berubah* (Once the water rises, the banks changed). This phrase seems relevant in understanding the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia. It gives an

² Azyumardi Azra, *Islam, State and Religious Pluralism in Southeast Asia*, The paper was presented in Congress of German Orientalist, Munster, Germany, 23-27 September 2013

³ Busman Edyar, *Santri dan Desekulerisasi*, Republika, 22 Oktober 2015

illustration that the socio-political changing in the power of the national structure affects the pattern of understanding and practicing Islam in Indonesia. Starting from colonial times, for example, it appeared that Muslims tend to be oriented to the effort on building the awareness of the society in order to fight the colonial policy. For instance, the establishment of the Islamic Trade League (SDI) in 1905 which later become Islamic League (SI) in 1912, Muhammadiyah (1912), Al Irsyad (1214), Persis (1923), NU (1924), and Al Majlis al Islamiy al A 'la Indonesia (MIAI) in 1937, describe the dialectic of Muslims in facing the socio-political problem that rapidly improved at the time.

Thus, as well as the Old Order Era which facing a long debate about the country's ideology that led to the release of the presidential decree on 1959. Meanwhile, the government of the New Order Era with the jargon of the economic development as the orientation of the development itself denied the involvement of the Islamic politic, it create the rise of the middle class of Muslim who is able to g¹² different characteristic in Islamic movement in Indonesia especially during the final phase of the New Order Era and in the beginning of the Reformation Era.

The emergence of the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia is related to the diversity and also in the application of Islam in the society and life of the nation. There are at least three forms of understanding; First, thing that makes Islam as an ideology that is manifested in the form of religious implementation (sharia) formally as positive law. That's why this orientation support structural approach in the socialization and institutionalization of Islamic teachings.

Second, it makes the national orientation is greater than the religious orientation. They only support the implementation of the ethical-moral religion (religio-ethics) and reject the formalization of religion in the context of the life of the nation. They even considered that the implementation of Islamic law was very problematic and would interfere the integrity of the nation. This sort of orientation supported the cultural aspect rather than the socialization and institutionalization of Islamic teachings structurally. In other words, the implementation of religious teaching no need to be institutionalized through the legislation as well as nation, but simply by the awareness of Muslims themselves.

Third, the other way between both of these orientations. Those who have equal orientation between Islamic and Nation insight that made Islam as a sub-ideology of Pancasila. This is a compromise of the developing aspirations where religion involved in public policy-making as constitutionally and democratically. It means that the orientation of supporting the Islamization with the implementation of Islamic teachings in the form of (1) formal for the private law, the law that related to family, Zakat, Hajj, etc. (2) substantially, such as the capital penalty for the criminal act for example a murder, it is correspond to the Islamic law although it doesn't formally call Qishash, and (3) When the implementation of both of the law is too difficult to do for example the punishment for the theft that is not the same with the Islamic law but essentially fulfilled the regulation that stealing is a crime that need punishment.⁴

Further, Munawwir Sadzali mentioned that there are 3 kind of the Muslims' understanding related to the religion and the nation; first, integralistic, who think that Islam and the Nation is a unity. That means between the the nation and Islam can be separated. This group claimed that Islam is not only a dogma which control the worship *mahdhah face to face* from a human to God, but Islam also control the matters pertaining to the nation, ethic, or even morality in society and the nation. Islam do not separated the state problem as the western country separated their religion matter to the pastor and the nation matter to their king (authority). The followers of this group believe that Islam is a complete religion. It's including the constitutional and political system. That's why, in the state matter, Muslim should refer to Islamic constitutional system. No need or even copy the western constitutional system. Besides, the constitutional and political system have to be followed is the system that have done by Prophet Muhammad and all the four khalifah rasyidin. The main characters of this group are Hasan al Banna, Rasyd Rida, Sayyid Qutub, Abul Ala al Maududi and Hasan Turabi.⁵

⁴ Masykuri Abdillah in Saripudin HA and M. I. Miawan Zein (Ed), *Syariat Islam Yes, Syariat Islam No: Dilema Piagam Jakarta dalam Amendemen UUD 1945*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001), P. 18-19

⁵ Munawwir Sadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara : Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran* (Jakarta : UI Press, 1990), p.1 See also Arsykal Salim in *Partai Islam dan Relasi Agama-Negara*, (Jakarta : Puslit IAIN Jakarta, 1999), p. 4

The integralistic group was very clinging onto the traditions of Islam. Because the tradition was generally regarded as the institutionalization of religious practices which must be believed in history and came from revelation, so then this model of the Islamic understanding that was believed to be an authentic Islam. Tradition contains sacredness, immortality, and the certain truth, the perennial wisdom, as well as continuous practice of the principles of eternal principal on the diverse conditions of space and time. A traditionalist can be defined as people who have a commitment into sharia that was the source of all laws and religious morality. Islamic traditionalism holds sharia as a whole of the law of Allah and its application in all aspects of life.

As being bound with the traditions that was believed to be originated from the sharia and has been exemplified by the early Moslems, traditionalists tend to protect the traditions and practices of the Salaf. They would oppose any form of changes such as the inclusion of science and modern technology or they would respond to the challenge of the West based on the paradigms that was offered by tradition to overcome the difficulties. Therefore, they prefer to refer from the past in addressing problems that occur now.

Rasyd Ridha, for example, assumed that the right political system must be based on group discussion between the caliphs and scholars who become the advisors in interpreting the Islamic law. In carrying out the obligations of *the ahl al-hall wa al aqdi*, that has to work on behalf of the Shari'a. When the syariat is not refering to the problem then the advice from Ulama is needed and they will have the Ijtihad. It explained that Rida was not only emphasis the conclusion that syariah should be protected or performed correctly, but he also concluded that the government that based on the the state won't last long without legislation.⁶

Therefore, the highest authority is on Allah and humans are only the executors of Allah's sovereignty as the caliph of Allah on earth. Thus, the idea of sovereignty of people can not be justified. And, as the executor of

⁶ M. Din Syamsudin, *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru*, (Logos : Jakarta, 2001), P.122

Allah's sovereignty, humans or the state should be obedient to the law as declared in Al-Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet.⁷

At least there are four principles that underlie the formation of an Islamic State: acknowledge the sovereignty of God, recognized the authority of the prophet, acknowledges the representative status of the Lord, and do the group consultation. At this point of view, the sovereignty is indeed sovereignty of God. A state only functioned as political tool by which the laws of God could be run. In other words, the state had no right to make or enforce any law on its own but acts as the main authority.⁸

Second, the understanding of secularistic which precisely separated between religion and state matter. The idea of a political foundation culturally is derived from Christianity. As Van Leewen's statement that the spread of Christianity throughout the Europe had brought secularisation. The secular culture, according to him, was Christian gifts to the world and he hoped that as a result of the meeting, Moslems would release the myth of law authority that organize life.⁹

Secularism is a social movement that aims to turn people away from the afterlife by solely oriented to the living world. This movement was launched since the Middle Ages society were very inclined to Allah and the judgement day, but away from the living world. Specifically, it was the legislation of a set of principles and practices that refuses any form of faith and worship. Then, they believed that religion and the affairs of the church as something that was not related at all with the affairs of government.¹⁰

In its development, the secular ideology was divided into two variants; 1. moderate secularism; considered religion as a private matter can't be interfered publicly such as politics and the material world. 2. Radical Secularism hostile other religion which considered an obstacle in the progress of communism.¹¹

⁷Munawwir Sadzali, , *Islam dan Tata Negara : Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran* (Jakarta : UI Press, 1990), p. 166

⁸ M. Din Syamsudin, *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru*, (Logos : Jakarta, 2001), p. 142

⁹Salahuddin Wahid in Saripudin HA and Kurniawan Zein (Ed), *Syari'at Islam Yes, Syariat Islam No: Dilema P*

¹⁰Y. 10. f Qardawi, *Sekuler Ekstrim (terj)*, (Jakarta : Pustaka Al Kausar, 2000), p.2

¹¹ Abdul Aziz Thaba, *Islam dan Negara Dalam Politik Orde Baru*, (Jakarta : Gema Insani Pers, 1996), p.37

For the adherents of this secular mazhab, Islam is equal to any other religion which does not regulate the matter of living world as well as Western countries. According to this ideology, Prophet Mohammed is just a common prophet as well as the former prophet with the only task which is to bring people back to the glorious life by upholding the noble character. It said that the Prophet never intended to establish and lead a country. The leading figure of this current is Ali Abd Raziq, Taha Hussein, and Kemal At Tarturk.¹²

Prototypical of Islamic countries that openly made the secularism to be the state's ideology was Turkey in the president Mustafa Kamal At Tarturk. As mentioned, in the New Constitution of Turkey in 1924 that Turkey is (1) a republic, (2) nationalist (3) citizenship (4) state (5) secularists and (6) revolutionalist.¹³

Third, a mutualistic understanding which is the middle of the two previous opinions (integralistic and sekuleristic). In this case the religion (Islam) was not an integral part of the state nor as a separated parts or not related at all. The relationship between religion and state are mutually beneficial. Even when religion was not used as an ideology or a source of law, but religion evolved with the help of the state (government).¹⁴ The third ideology resisted the notion that Islam is a complete religion and Islam has a constitutional system. But this ideology also resisted western notion that believe Islam is a religion that only regulate the relationship between man and his creator. This ideology think that Islam has no constitutional system but it has a set of ethical values for the state matter. In this case the state and religion (Islam) do not mean to be in a single unit or in a face to face position) but, more in mutual beneficial position.

In the practice, this understanding tends to be more flexible in understanding and practicing Islam in the society life and state matter. For them, it was a possibility of taking other teachings in addition to Islam itself. Because Islam itself only manages living matters which are basic typically. While, it technically could adopt another system, such as

¹² Munawwir Sadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara : Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1990), p. 1-2

the Western system, which has demonstrated its advantages. Among the leaders of this group is Mohammad Abduh, Hussein Haikal, and Muhammad Asad.¹⁵

According to Haykal, the form of Islamic state government was built on the theory that in Islam, there is no standardized system of government (*nizam muqarrar* or *nizam Thabit*). Islam simply to put a set of values of ethics that can serve as a basic guideline for setting behavior (mysticism) in life to each other (*muamalah*). Haikal meant with the basic guideline is the principle of Tawheed, the laws, and equality of human beings. The basic guidelines is the basis formulation of the basic principles of Islamic countries principle namely the principle of fraternity, equality and liberty. The third principles are the basis for the management of Islamic countries in the early days.¹⁶

At the age of Prophet Mohammed, Islam has covered Mecca and Medina as its teritorial area. But the Prophet was still allowing the areas that have conquered using of the laws and systems of government in accordance suitable to each culture and traditions that had been practiced long before Islam. Islam guaranted freedom of every tribe and provide greater opportunities for them to organize their respective communities.¹⁷

This mutualistic discourse was closely linked to the substansialistic idiology in Indonesia. According to this group, al-Qur'an never explained or simply call an Islamic state; Shari'ah (which is seen by scripturalists as a legal basis for an Islamic state) can not be considered as positive law; the constitution that are applied in Indonesia must recognize fully the political rights and to the role of non-Muslims (in this case the Constitutions 1945 is believed that it is in line with the Charter of Medina and that the principles of Islam, including the most fundamental is *tauhid*: The one and only God has emblazoned in the Constitution 1945 and Pancasila.¹⁸

¹⁶ Musdah Mulia, *Negara Islam Pemikiran Politik Husain Haikal*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001), p. 203

¹⁷ Musdah Mulia, *Negara Islam Pemikiran Politik Husain Haikal*, p. 221

¹⁸ William Lidle, *Skripturalisme Media Dakwah : Sebuah Bentuk Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam di Indonesia Masa Orde Baru* in Mark R Woodward, *Jalan Baru Islam Memetakan Paradigma Mutakhir Islam di Indonesia*, (Bandung : Mizan, 1998), p. 286

At least there are four main ideas of this substansialist: 1) the view that the substance or content of faith and charity was more important than the form itself. The obedience of Moslems literally to the commands of the Al-Qur'an even regarding the major issues such as prayer command that the value is considered less important than the moral and ethical behavior in accordance with the spirit of the Al-Qur'an. 2) the messages of Al-Qur'an and Hadith which is eternal in its essence and universal meaning, must be interpreted in accordance with the social conditions prevailing at the time. The substansialist used several terms to describe the application of those principles in Islam in Indonesia as "secularisation", desacralization, re-actualization and indigenization. 3) There should be a tolerance towards the development of opinions within Islam itself, or toward non-Moslems. Because no one can be sure that their understanding of nash (aqidah) as the most true. 4) the substansialist accepted Indonesian government structures that make Constitution 1945 as the foundation of the state and Pancasila as the basic of the state. Because those two are already in line with the principles of political Islam.¹⁹

Islam in Indonesia in Old Order Era

Throughout the history of the Indonesia, integralistic mainstream, symbiotic, and this secularistic constantly influence the nation history. In the beginning of independence day, for instance this has been a debate on the basis of the country then known as the Jakarta Charter controversy. On the other hand there was a integralistic group that wishing to impose Islamic law in Indonesia. At that time Muslims were represented by AbikusnoTjokroesoejoso, Agus Salim, Wahid Hasyim, and Abdul Kahar Muzakar who insisted on struggling on the enactment of Islamic Law to be put in constitution.²⁰ The apprehensive about the collapse of the young Indonesia because of the disunity was the main reason to compromise by removing the seven words in the debate.

²⁰ In formulating the Jakarta Charter the nine committee that consist of secular nationalist group and muslim nationalist with the comparison 5 to 4. They are Sukarno, Hatta, Yamin, Ahmad Soebardjo and Maramis as secular nasionalist. On the other hand, there are 8 Abikusno Tjokroesoejoso, Agus Salim, Wahid Hasyim, and Abdul Kahar Muzakar. See. Endang Syaifuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 Sebuah Konsensus Nasional Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia*, (Jakarta : Gema Insani Pers, 2001), p. 42

At the time of the constituency also appeared the massive desire among formalist Islam to enter Islam as the basic of the state. Even the conflicts that had occurred already entered the realm of ideology in which their desire to replace the Pancasila ideology with Islam. In this period it appeared a lengthy debate about the basic of the country problems in the constituent assembly. While the polemics became personally serious between Natsir Islamists with secular Sukarno. When the Assembly began its work in November 1956, there were three proposals to form the basis of this country; Pancasila, Islam, and socio-economics. Pancasila was support by the Indonesian Nationalist Party (116 members), the Communist of Indonesia Party (including fractions Republic Proclamation, 80 members), the Indonesian Christian Party (16), the Catholic Party (10), the Indonesia Socialist Party (10) Association of Supporters of Indonesian Independence (8 members) and the other with a membership of 273 representatives.

While the second proposal, Islam was derived from the Shura Muslimin Indonesia Council (112 Members), NU (91), Syarikat Islam Indonesia Party (16) Association of Tarbiyah Islam (7), and the four small parties that totally 230 members of the constituent assembly. While the third proposal, namely socioeconomic only supported by nine members consisting of the Labour Party consist of five people the party of Murba consist of 4 people.²¹

The significant difference was very related to the vote result of the election in 1955. In this election, the Islamic parties gained less than 45 percent of all collected votes. In accordance with the Constitution of 1950 which also controlled the election, a new constitution could only be ratified when the draft of the constitution was approved by at least 2/3 of the members that attended the meeting. Therefore²², based on this regulation, the struggle of a constitution that intended to create an Islamic state or a state based on Islam became impossible. However, the debate was still occurring until President Sukarno dismissed the Constituent Council in 1955 through a decree of July 5, 1959.

²¹ Endang Saifudin Anshari, Endang Syaifuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 Sebuah Konsensus Nasional Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia*, (Jakarta : Gema Insani Press, 2001), p. 42

²² Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante*, (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1996), p. 124

The impact of secularization in Turkey was seemed to be very influential for Sukarno when he became President²³. Sukarno regarded of the nationalism concept between religion and state matter should be separated. This separation seemed to be based on his knowledge of Islam with its political actions in the decade of the 19th century and early of 20th century. Further reason behind this separation are the following:

1. In the time of the Usmaniyah/Ottoman Caliphs (Khalifah Usmaniyah) in Turkey, there had been dualism of law; the first was law of Islam and the Shari'a and the second was the law that was delivered by the Sultan or Caliph or parliament. This dualism of law led into a regression, because the influence of Shaykh al-Islam remained dominant while their viewpoint was conservative and not ensuring the improvement of Islam, even would detained it.
2. Islam that embraced by people of Turkey was no longer the true Islam but according to him was Three Faced Islam; Greece, Iran and Arab. Therefore, if it kept occurring when religion was used for regime, would always be used as a tool of punishment in the hands of kings, wrongdoers and those iron-fisted men. Because of having unity of religion and the state would not ensure improvement, especially economic improvement even it could be obstacle factor.
3. Islam itself with the unity would be obstructed and captivated. Therefore this separation has dual benefits which both could bring in profits. The first was releasing religion from the state and the second was releasing the state from religion. The freedom of religion and the state would possibly allow both to move forward.²⁴

Islam in New Order Era

¹² In the early years of the New Order, the dynamics of Muslims reappeared with the demands of formalization of Islam's shari'a from the integralistic group. In MPRS Council meeting in March 1968; for example,

²³ Badri Yatim, *Sukarno, Islam dan Nasionalisme*, (Jakarta : Logos Wacana Ilmu, 1999), p. 140

²⁴ Badri Yatim, *Sukarno, Islam dan Nasionalisme*, p. 141

NU and Parmusi tried to propose Charter of Jakarta to be ratified as the opening of the Constitution of 1945. All of the involvement of these leaders even entering the ideology of state, remained essentially still put Pancasila as the national principle. They were only insisting on the clarity of implementation of the Charter of Jakarta. Only by having this action, the implementation of Islamic law, whether civil or criminal law could be realized.²⁵

It arised sort of romanticism on the revival time of political Islam due to the ⁸ contribution of Islam in helping to tear down the Old Order regime. The victory of the New Order was considered as a victory of Islam so that was not an exaggeration when later among Islamic leaders expecting the realization of an Islamic state. Logically, since the New Order was born with the idealism of democracy, then Muslims have high hopes to re-participate by considering the majority of Indonesia's population ⁷ is Muslim. Even before 1971, some Muslim leaders struggled to make Islam as the basis of the state. For example, by rehabilitating Masjumi and formed PDII (Democratic of Indonesian Islam Party and reactivate the Indonesian Islamic Party.)²⁶

Beside appearing in the form of a formalist action, further the concept of integrating Islam and the country also summoned more radical fundamentalist group in fighting for Islam. In fact, this group wanted to change the state ideology of Indonesia into an Islamic state even through war. The action of the Darul Islam / Islamic Army of Indonesia in West Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and Central Java, for example, was a concrete form of that desire.²⁷

M Natsir, one of the figure who wanted to change the state foundation confirmed that by making Islam as the state foundation was not detrimental to the Pancasila defender. Instead, it would retrieve a philosophy state which were alive, spirited, firm and containing power. None of ³ the five precepts in Pancasila would be slipped or shed by accepting Islam as the basis of the state. Because in Islam, there was a

²² Masykuri Abdillah, *Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna "Respon Intelektual Muslim di Indonesia Terhadap Konsep Demokrasi 1966-1993"* (Yogyakarta : PT Tiara Wacana, 1999), ¹⁷ 8

²⁶ Abdul Aziz Thaba, *Islam dan Negara Dalam Politik Orde Baru*, (Jakarta : Gema Insani Pers, 1996), p. 242-243

²⁷ Al Chaidar, *Wacana Ideologi Negara Islam*, (Jakarta : Darul Falah, 1999), p. 55

rule where pure concept of the five precepts received real substance and received soul and driven spirit.²⁸

In his speech of the Constituent Council in 1957, Nasir affirmed his principle on Islam's relationship to the state in Indonesia. In the speech titled Islam as the basic of State, Nasir delivered that Indonesia had only two options, secularism (la diniyah) or state of the religion (diniyi). The position of Pancasila itself was La diniyah (secular). Because, Pancasila was the result of the invention of the community not using the revelation as the source.²⁹

For Natsir, Islam is a philosophy of life, an ideology, a system of life to the human victory in the world and the hereafter. So as Muslims, they could not escape from politics, as well as politicians could not break away from the ideology of Islam. To establish Islam, it could not be separated from the human development of a country and freedom. For the issue of the relation between human beings, the function of religion is to maintain that connection in all living aspects. Politically brings in one aspect of relationship between human being. While the function of religion is to maintain this connection with all aspects of life. So how could the religion that covers all aspects could be possibly separated from the political aspect which only covers one aspect.³⁰

That is why Nasir invited to see Islam as a majority religion in Indonesia so that was fit to put it as the foundation of a state. Besides, the teaching of Islam has the perfect qualities for the life of the nation and society and could ensure the diversity of living between the various groups with tolerance. Thus, country was a tool of Islam to implement the law of Allah for human's salvation and welfare. As an absolute tool of a state. Therefore, Natsir defended the principle of religious unity in this country.³¹

²⁸ Endang Saefudin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 Sebuah Konsensus Nasional Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia*, (Jakarta : Gema Insani Pers, 2001), Cet, II, h. 84

²⁹ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante*, (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1996), p. 127

³⁰ Masykuri Abdillah, *Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna "Respon Intelektual Muslim di Indonesia Terhadap Konsep Demokrasi 1966-1993"* (Yogyakarta : PT Tiara Wacana, 1999), p. 35-36

³¹ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante*, p. 128

In addition, the historical reasons that experienced by Indonesian was a supporting factor for this formalization demand. Besides applying Islamic law in Indonesia, in the struggle for independence and defence of Indonesia, Muslims also had their main roles. Even the victory of the New Order government in tearing down the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) to its roots in 1966, could not be separated from the role of Muslims in the action. Because when PKI performed 'coup d'état' over government in October 1, 1965 was defeated, the actual existence of PKI remained still strong, both in the government, society, and the military. In this condition the Armed Forces created a third hand to avoid internal conflicts between military. That third hand was from Islam and the action of the students / youth / scholars. While Armed Forces only facilitated on the back (as back up).³²

Meanwhile, for Muslims themselves, against the PKI was closely related to two things; First, ideologically, communism could not be accepted by Muslims. The existence of atheists (anti-God) was rejected by Muslims. Atheists are regarded as infidels and shed his blood was *halal*. And fighting against the PKI was believed to be a *jihad*. Even as Thaba Aziz wrote, a leader of Muhammadiyah published a *fatwa* that the resistance of crushing the PKI was worship.³³

Second, historically the existence of PKI to Indonesian Muslims was often be a thorn in one's flesh. It could not be denied that all this time, conflicts happened seriously between PKI and Islam in Indonesia. For example, the dismissal of the Shura Council of the Muslim Party of Indonesia (Masjumi) in 1963, could not be separated from the inputs of PKI that influenced the policies of President Sukarno. So it was not exaggeration when people of Indonesia condemned the action of PKI, the Muslims were at the front line together with other national public organizations demanding the dismissal and banning this ideology to spread in the society. Three days after the rebellion, PKI was successfully disabled. Some of Islamic organizations like NU, Muhammadiyah, PSII, and several other organizations formed the Demolition Action Unit (KAP)

Gestapu that was chaired by Subchan ZE of NU and secretary general Lukman Harun from Muhammadiyah.³⁴

Even further, according to Din Syamsudin, the failure coup d'état of PKI itself was largely due to the role of the Islamic masses who supported the armed forces in suppressing the entire communist elements throughout the country. PKI had long been opposed to the Army and Islamic mass organizations with a variety of reasons. To Islamic organizations and the Army, PKI was a political rival. To the armed forces, the rebellion in Madiun in 1948 was an experience that could not be forgotten. Meanwhile, to Islamic group, PKI was anti-Islamic groups and fighting against PKI was a matter of life or death. PKI did not only affect President Sukarno to accelerate Masjumi ban in 1960, but also banning its youth actions, the Indonesian Islamic Youth Action (GPII) in 1963, because it was suspected for the involvement of an attempt to assassinate President Sukarno in 1957. In addition, the Association of Islamic Students were also required by PKI to be dissolved after associated it with Masjumi. But the huge amount of support from Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and the Armed Forces, led this organization survived from the dissolution.³⁵

With this background, logically when Suharto gained the power, Muslims should have received greater attention. Because, besides a majority factor, historically Muslims indirectly participated to drive Suharto to gain power. Due to the rejection of accountability speech of Sukarno on High Level Assembly at MPR in 1967 related to rebellion of PKI above, necessarily had appointed Suharto as temporary/ Alternate of President, which was later appointed permanently in 1967.

But unfortunately the romanticism between the New Order government and the Muslims was not long lasting. The paradigm of prioritizing economic development had made the New Order government was prioritizing more on stability of security aspects (even tend to be authoritarian). New Order government tried to convince the people that the Indonesia's future must be free of politics based on ideology. The ideological conflict was considered as the inheritance from the past that

³⁴ Panji Masyarakat, 21 Maret 1987 dan Panji Masyarakat, no. 590, Oktober 1988, h. 34

³⁵ Panji Masyarakat, h. 34

must be removed. Accordingly, it was required to establish a society that was free from ideological conflicts and prioritize the economic development of outward-oriented.³⁶

That was why everything that was considered to shake up the national stability eliminated as early as possible. No exception to the Islamic movement in its history had always wanted the validity of Islamic law in Indonesia. The clashes between Muslims and the New Order regime frequently occurred. It was driven also by the historical background where many separatist movements in the name of Islam. Muslims were considered had less loyalty to the national ideology, or at least the Muslims wanted to provide some sort of self interpretation to the ideology outside of the ruler interpretation. This prejudgement was treated continuously through the reproducing of traumas of the past history of Muslims. Uncoincidentally, if that prejudgement continued to be reproduced along with various disobedience actions committed by Muslims, especially in early process of forming the New Order.³⁷

That was why after Suharto at the top of power, Muslims movement was started to be pushed aside. Various policies in the name of religion increasingly eliminated in this period. By the reason of maintaining the stability, all things which related to Islam was suppressed as early as possible. M. Natsir express his fury by saying -as quoted by Fachry Ali of Ruth Mc Vey- *They have treated us like cats with ringworm*. When translated more or less means that they treat us (Muslim politicians) like cats with ringworm.³⁸

The climax point was when all the principles of organization and social-political organization must be based on Pancasila. The unification of political parties principle with the principle of Pancasila had taken out the color of Islam. This political suppression was absolutely affected the struggle of Muslim movement. Because by only political way the struggle could be more effective. In addition, not even to think about the implementation of

³⁶ M. Din Syamsudin, *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru*, (Jakarta : PT Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001), p. 30

³⁷ M. Syafi'i Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia Sebuah Kajian Politik Tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru*, (Jakarta : Paramadina, 1995), p. 20

³⁸ Yusril Ihza Mahendra, *Keharusan Demokratisasi? Tanggapan terhadap Fachri Ali dalam Nasrullah Ali Fauzi*, ICMI : Antara Status Quo dan Demokratisasi, (Bandung : Mizan, 1995), p. 150

Islamic law, to declare themselves as Muslims could arise fear or embarrassment among Muslims.

However, the effort of integralistic group to enforce the implementation of Shari'a in Indonesia was never extinguished. Although politically Muslims position was squeezed down, but culturally Islamic activity did not stop even growing healthy. DR M Bambang Pranowo examined in Tegalrejo village and he found a great change in rural west slopes of Mount Merbabu, where in the '60s (pre-New Order) was the village where the *abangan* parties and Islam was dominant (read: PNI, PKI, and NU). But after the disappearance of political parties, precisely restore the embrace of Islam to the entire population of the village, which known was almost entirely Muslim. Though in the past era, the area was famous *aspyok-poyokan* era (harassing each other era) among different political parties supporters. The construction of the prayer house in every part of the village (including those that used to be supporting PKI), the recitation activities which was performed every Friday night and followed by almost all villagers, the construction of three mosques and four prayer houses which always filled with children to reciting Al-Quran, became witness of glory of Islamic atmosphere in Tegalrejo precisely after the political parties was no longer in this village.³⁹

In a broader context, it might be also considered as change of the New Order regime attitude of confrontational become accommodational. It was much that the interests of Muslims was successfully well accommodated by the state. The emersion of some laws which related to Muslims was essentially another form of formalization efforts over the years. Such as Law No. 1/1974 on Marriage, Law No. 9/1989 on the Religious Courts, Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1991 on KHI and so on.

Behind the depoliticization of Islam brought the impact of Islam Cultural. The emergence of moderate Muslim groups from among Indonesia's circle also diversified opinions., Amin Rais for example, said that the Al-Qur'an and the Sunnah did not order to establish an Islamic state, but both provide a clear ethics to regulate all human life. Muslim life was a unity between the profane and between the transcendental and between the world and hereafter matters. If Al-Quran and Sunnah

³⁹ Fachry Ali, *Keharusan Demokratisasi Dalam Islam Indonesia* dalam Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi, (Ed), *ICMI : Antara Status Quo dan Demokratisasi* Bandung : Mizan, 1995), p. 126

explicitly instructed to establish an Islamic state, they must give a detailed order on the structure of state institutions, the system of people representation, the relationship between the legislative, executive, and judiciary, elections and so on. This detailed explanation, according to Amin Rais would only make the Islamic state was only suitable in the seventh century. Whereas the social development was constantly changing. Surely the system would very quickly left behind and could not be a solution for its time. Thus, that did not mean that Muslims could establish the state according to their own will and ignored the principles of Islam. Because it would lead to the establishment of a secular state. In this case Rais saw the importance of Shariah as a source of law.⁴⁰

Ahmad Syafii Maarif also argued that the Al-Qur'an did not propose a specific model of the structure of political organization that must be implemented by Muslims. Maarif noted that the political power for collective life was the most important need of religion. Without its supports, the religion would not stand up. It meant that the state just a tool for religion and not a religious expansion. So the phrase *al Islam al din wa al daulah* could obscure the prophetic essence of Muhammad. As his explanation, he agreed that Islam is a religion and Sharia law.⁴¹

In line with this was Syafruddin Prawiranegara who said that the *dar al Islam* was not important. Throughout Muslims were not hindered in realizing the goals and were not obstructed by the Tyranny power, then Pancasila was not a problem to accept. The theory of *dar al Islam* is not important, the importance is the implementation which is the good deeds of Muslims that driven solely by obedience to Allah is for the good of human sake, either Muslim or non-Muslim. That was why Syafruddin criticized all wishes to make Indonesia to be the country as Pakistan, especially if the fight to make it happen through violence. The struggle⁴² must be through the proper channels in accordance with the laws without ignoring the existing reality in the country and the process of development showed regularly and perfect condition.

⁴⁰ Masykuri Abdillah, *Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna "Respon Intelektual Muslim di Indonesia Terhadap Konsep Demokrasi 1966-1993"* (Yogyakarta : PT Tiara Wacana, 1999), p. 62

⁴¹ Masykuri Abdillah, *Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna "Respon Intelektual Muslim di Indonesia Terhadap Konsep Demokrasi 1966-1993"* p. 62

⁴² Masykuri Abdillah, *Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna "Respon Intelektual Muslim di Indonesia Terhadap Konsep Demokrasi 1966-1993"* p. 67

Islam in Reformation Era

Since Suharto's resignation from his power on 21 May 1998, Indonesia entered a new phase in the history of the nation. Simultaneously, all the people welcomed the changing of power in the hope they would be free from authoritarian government to democratic. At that time arose Habibie as a successor to relay state leaders. Although it was not separated dogged by demonstrations of rejecting his leadership, he remained unmoved to run the government until the the 1999 election was held.

In the middle rush of spirit of the Indonesian people to welcome the change, among Muslims in Indonesia appeared two interesting phenomena; First, the emergence of Islamic political parties on the national stage. From the 48 participants of the election that eligible to enter election, 20 of them were Islamic parties such as PPP, PAN, PKB, PBB, PK, PKU PNU, SUNI Party, PUI, PP, PSII, PSII 1905, Masjumi Party, and others.⁴³

25 From the 20 parties, there were only five political parties that did not agree with the formalization of Islamic law in Indonesia. In other words, the majority wanted the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia.

Second, the emergence of mass organizations of Islam shaped as harakah such as Laskar Jihad, Ahlussunah Waljamaah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Mujahideen, followed the other Islamic movement that were already standing in the New Order period such as the Islamic Defenders Front, World Muslim Solidarity Committee (KISDI), and Muslim Workers Unity (PPMI) and others. Unlike to the organizations before that existed and accommodative with the government (such as NU and Muhammadiyah), these organizations tend to distance themselves from the government. As RWilliam Liddle said who was called by Islam scripturalist, these groups did not see themselves engaged in the intellectual activity that tried to adapt the message of Muhammad and the meaning of Islam into the social conditions in the end of the 20th century. According to them, the messages and meanings was clearly rooted in the

⁴³ Arsykal Salim mengidentifikasi parpol Islam dengan lima kriteria seperti nama, asas, tanda gambar, tujuan, program, dan konstituen. (Lih. M Arsykal Salim, *Partai Islam dan Relasi Agama-Negara*, Jakarta : Puslit IAIN Jakarta, 1999, h. 8)

² Al-Qur'an and Hadith and only needs to be applied in life. Therefore, they more tend to be oriented to the Shari'a (formalization).⁴⁴

After New Order government, born a few products of legislation which was the accommodation for Muslims²¹ such as Law No. 10/1998 on Banking, Law No.17/1999 on Hajj, Law No. 38/1999 on Zakat Management and Law No.17/2000 Third Amendment of 1983 On Income Tax⁴⁵. In addition, there was the National Sharia Board which was formed in early 1999 to complete the Islamic banking which was set before in Law No. 10/1998.

But since it only just accommodated the Islamic civil matter, among Indonesian Muslims still appeared desire to fight for the implementation of Islamic criminal law as well. The phenomenon in the meetings of the Member Council (BP) of MPR and Annual Meeting of the MPR Council in 1999 and 2000, for example, showed the efforts of several Islamic political parties such as the United Development Party, the *Bulan Bintang* Party, which insisted on fighting for formalization in the parliament. The same thing was done by several other Islamic organizations like FPI, Lasykar Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood and others. Formalization of Sharia law (especially criminal aspects) became the main purpose of their struggle.

Along with the rampantly cases of terrorism in Indonesia and throughout the world, there was a push in the part of Muslims in Indonesia to develop an understanding of Islam ala Indonesia that called *Islam Nusantara*. The term was first introduced by NU in 33rd congress in 2015. *Islam Nusantara* has the distinction not only in the tradition and practice of Islam which is rich and full of nuances, but also in social, cultural and political. Formation of *Islam Nusantara* orthodoxy associated with differences (khilafiyah or furu'iyah) among scholars authoritative based on *mazhab* and its ideology. Furthermore, it also related to the dynamics and the historical development of the Muslims Nusantara itself. Since the 17th century, for example, the '*ulama Jawi* (Nusantara) who

⁴⁴ ⁴ William Liddle, Skripturalisme Media Dakwah : Sebuah Bentuk Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam di Indonesia Masa Orde Baru, dalam Mark W Woodward (ed), *Jalan Baru Islam, Memetakan Paradigma Mutakhir Islam Indonesia*, Bandung : Mizan, 1998, hal.289, Cet. I

⁴⁵ Sudirman Teba, *Islam Pasca Orde Baru*, Yogyakarta : PT Tiara Wacana Yogya, 2001, Cet. 1 hal. 62

returned from Mecca and Medina– as the center of cosmopolitan theologian network where they were included; they consolidated the doctrine and practice of Islamic Nusantara orthodoxy. That Islamic orthodoxy was inherited and restrained faithfully by Muslims of Nusantara up to this day. Muslims of Nusantara not only has the Islamic orthodoxy that came from the authoritative theologian, but the archipelago itself was formed into the realm of Islamic culture (Islamic cultural spheres) distinctive.⁴⁶

Conclusion

The dynamics of Islam in Indonesia is a portrait of the dialectic of Muslims in Indonesia in facing its era. Sometimes the dynamic was appeared by political problems (power). Sometimes it also intersected with economic issues, and even caused by social issue that grows in its time. Among those few difference background, which often affecting political issue and power. This become understandable since the problem of power is not only a sensitive issue for any religious people, but at the same time is believed to be a starting point that will play a major pendulum of the national history where Muslims are in it. A culmination point of this difference of opinion seemed to disimplicate to trichotomy of Islam-state relations; whether integralistic, secularistic, or mutualistic.

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⁴⁶ Azyumardi Azra, *Islam Nusantara: Islam Indonesia*, Republika, 25 Juni 2015

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